The John Birch Society - The Fearful Master - Chapter 10


<<Chapter 9


Chapter 11>>


The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who, in a period of moral crisis, maintain their neutrality.

Alighieri Dante, 1300


Anyone who doubts the potent, if intangible, force of the United Nations should consider the eagerness even of Communist regimes to join a club which is, and will continue to be, managed predominantly by its non-Communist members.1

This statement by United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson is a classic example of the technique of combining an observable fact with an absurd conclusion. The eagerness of Communist regimes to join the United Nations is a fact that cannot be concealed. But since the obvious implications of this fact are not in accord with the image which the internationalists wish to present to the American people, we are told that (1) the Communists are eager to join the United Nations because it is a "potent, intangible force," and (2) the United Nations is, and will continue to be, managed by non-Communists.

As for the potent-intangible-force argument, little needs to be said. Anyone who is familiar with even the bare rudiments of Communist strategy and tactics knows that the Communists do not join or support an organization merely because it is a potent force. They join organizations either to destroy them or to take them over and use them for their own purposes; they support an organization only if it advances the cause of Communism. But how can this be if the organization is, as Mr. Stevenson says, managed predominantly by its non-Communist members?

Part of the answer became painfully obvious during the investigation of United States "non-Communist" employees at the United Nations. The other part is the subject of this chapter.

At the time of this writing, the United Nations has approximately six thousand employees in the Secretariat. About one fourth of these are classified as professional, which means that they hold top supervisory and policy-making positions. These are filled according to the geographical origin of the member nations and in proportion to the various contributions to the total UN budget. The United States, therefore, is entitled to approximately one third of the "professional" appointments. The two-thirds balance comes from other nations--Communist as well as non-Communist.

Theoretically, the United States bars Communists from bolding government jobs. But as we have seen, this has been only a minor inconvenience to the party faithful. For years, secret underground Communist agents have moved with ease throughout our entire governmental structure where they have been protected and promoted. The exposures of a few years ago were the result of congressional investigations which now have been, for all practical purposes, completely discontinued.

In France the Communist party is the biggest political party in the entire country, and it holds the balance of power in the French Assembly. The French constitution even goes out of its way to make it illegal to discriminate against Communists in government jobs. A Communist is head of the French atomic energy agency and was recently made advisor to the European center of nuclear research.2 It would be absurd not to expect the Communists to be well represented among France's quota of employees and delegates at the United Nations.

Italy is in almost the same position. At each election for the past eight or nine years the Communists, posing as a legitimate political party, have gained a larger and larger vote at the polls to the point where today they hold the balance of political power in that country. Much of this power in Italy comes from the influential labor unions, the largest of which is completely Communist dominated.

As the Wall Street Journal observed:

The Italian government can't legally keep Communists out of the Government. Further, the laws there provide that questionable characters have the same right to government jobs as anybody else, even if the job is a "classified" position. Also, there are no statutes the Library of Congress can find to protect military secrets.3

Even Great Britain allows Communists to hold government jobs so long as they are not classified as sensitive positions. The British do not consider United Nations employment as sensitive.4

A Senate subcommittee investigating this situation reported that certain UN delegates from foreign countries have been invited to Communist party headquarters in New York to lecture local party leaders. One of these was from the French delegation who gave a speech on the problems of the French Communist party in relation to the situation in Indochina. The other was from the Indian delegation who lectured on the problems faced by the Communist party in India with the dissemination of propaganda.5

Mr. Joseph Z. Kornfeder, a former Communist who trained in Moscow and who specialized in methods of Communist political warfare in this country, spoke before the Congress of Freedom in 1955 and told his audience:

How many Communists, fellow travelers and sympathizers there are among the UN employees, no one seems to know, but judging by their number among the American personnel, there can be no doubt that the Communists control the UN and its staff association, and use it for all its worth; which means that most of the special agencies at UN headquarters are, in fact, operated by them and coordinated through the Communist cell in the UN staff association.6

The situation was summarized by the U.S. News and World Report in 1952 when it stated:

U.S. authorities have no power to dig into the backgrounds of UN employees from other nations, although they have information indicating heavy Communist infiltration among these employees. Some UN employees who come from Great Britain, France, Mexico, Canada and other non-Communist countries are known or suspected Communists. . . . An informed estimate suggests that as many as one-half of the 1,350 administrative executives in the UN are either Communists or people who are willing to do what they want.7 [Italics added.]

Note that the date of this estimate was 1952. Communist influence within the governments of the world has greatly expanded during the intervening years.

Since the United Nations was first launched in 1945 the secretary-general has traditionally been portrayed to the American people as the epitome of neutralism, the ideal non-Communist (as distinguished from an anti-Communist)--the truly impartial man. If the secretary-general had been portrayed as openly anti-American and pro-Communist, we Americans would have withdrawn our support long ago. Knowing this, the strategists decided from the very beginning to select men with obscure pasts; men who were not actual party members but who were ideologically so compatible that they could be relied upon to carry the ball for the party. A brief look at the record will illustrate the wisdom of this strategy.

Trygve Lie: Politically, Trygve Lie, the first United Nations secretary-general, was a dedicated socialist, a labor lawyer, and a high ranking member of the Social Democratic Labor party in Norway-an offshoot of the early Communist International.8 According to Leon Trotsky, one of the founders of the worldwide Communist apparatus: "The Norwegian Workers' party had the reputation of being a radical party. . . . In the past, it belonged to the Third [Communist] International."

Trotsky further revealed that Trygve Lie was no stranger to the Communists in those early days. Lie had visited Moscow in 1921 and, as Trotsky put it, had been identified with the Comintern at that time.

When Trotsky--the archenemy and rival of Stalin--was exiled in Norway, Trygve Lie was the minister of justice of that country. Acting in accordance with the wishes of Stalin, Lie confronted Trotsky with an ultimatum of choosing between either ceasing all criticism of the Communist regime in Moscow or going to jail. Trotsky continued to write exposes of the ruthlessness of Stalin and his henchmen. Lie, consequently, had him thrown in prison and later deported him to Mexico.9

Commenting on the desirability of admitting Red China to the UN, Lie revealed an almost unbelievable naivety about the nature of Communism when he wrote:

Once before, the world had seen a Communist state-- the USSR-- isolated by the West after a successful revolution. I had always believed that this was a great mistake and that the West, instead, should have sought every means to fuller intercourse with Russia in the 1920's. Such a policy might well have influenced the development of the Soviet state in a direction other than the one it took.10

One of the first items on the agenda of the newly created United Nations was the election of the president of the General Assembly. At first the United States delegation considered nominating Lie for the position but later shifted its support to Henri Spaak, a Belgian socialist. What happened next is described by Lie:

On the morning of the 10th-- the day on which the president of the assembly was to be elected-- Feodore T. Gousev, the Soviet ambassador in London, sought me out. His delegation, he said, had been informed by the Americans of my withdrawal; nevertheless the USSR, together with its Eastern European associates, wanted to nominate me . . .. His delegation had conferred with the United States delegation upon hearing of my withdrawal and, as a result of the meeting, the Americans had agreed to revert to their original support of my candidacy. The Soviet Union would nominate me, he added, and the Americans would vote for me. . . .

Mr. Gromyko strode to the rostrum and declared:

"Weighing the candidatures which have recently been mentioned in connection with the election of the president the Soviet delegation has come to the conclusion that the most appropriate candidature would be that of the foreign minister of Norway, Mr. Trygve Lie." . . .

Wincenty Rzymowski of Poland then rose in dutiful support of the nomination, and spoke of Norway and of me in generous terms. He was followed by Dimitri Manuilsky, the "old Bolshevik" from pre-Stalin days who was then foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR. . . .

Spaak won the election by just three votes, but, as Lie reminisced: "There is no doubt that the results of that election were felt long after, and clearly influenced the subsequent election of the secretary-general."11

The post of secretary-general is infinitely more important than that of president of the assembly. So when the time came to fill this post, Washington and Moscow once again moved in unison. Lie wrote:

I recall something that Andrei Vyshinsky said in the course of a conversation in London just before my election as Secretary-General. It was a most friendly talk in which Vyshinsky said that both the Soviet Union and the United States warmly advocated my nomination, and that Mr. Bevin [of Great Britain] could be "brought around."12

As mentioned previously, Trygve Lie was outspoken in his advocacy of the admission of Red China to the United Nations. He had even taken the initiative in trying to drum up sufficient votes to make this possible. He further took the stand that Chiang Kai-shek should be ousted from Formosa.13

It is no wonder, then, that the Communists were well pleased at having such a "non-Communist" at the head of the United Nations. But Americans were led to believe just the opposite. During, the Korean War, for instance, the Soviet delegation put on an impressive performance of pouting in public, supposedly over the way in which Lie was standing firm against their aggression. It was corny acting but good enough to fool the American public--which is all it was intended to do. How the Communists really felt about Trygve Lie is best revealed by Lie himself. When Lie first threatened to resign as secretary-general (be threatened to do so on several occasions), he went to discuss the matter with his good friend Gromyko.

. . . I went to see Mr. Gromyko. . . . I announced the feeling that I should resign in protest at the American shift of position, and I have never found Ambassador Gromyko more friendly. His melancholy features fit up with sympathy. But he seemed half alarmed at my idea. "Speaking for myself," he said, "I hope you will not resign, and I advise you against it. What good will it do? How will it change American policy? In any case, I would be grateful if you would take no action before I have time to consult my government."

Tuesday, Mr. Gromyko took me aside. He had cabled Moscow, he reported, and Moscow's reply was "No, definitely not!"14

Much later, at the height of the controversy over Communist penetration into the American quota at the United Nations, Trygve Lie finally did resign and was soon replaced by Dag Hammarskjold.

Dag Hammarskjold: The rape of Katanga was primarily the result of his planning and direction. Although portrayed to the American people as a great humanitarian, one need only recall his policy of deliberate deception, outright lying and utter disregard for human suffering to fully appreciate the absurdity of such an image. In this regard Conor O'Brien unintentionally indicted himself, Hammarskjold, and the whole United Nations when he wrote:

The greater the ambiguity in a Security Council decision, the wider was the Secretary-General's margin of interpretation. Through ambiguities resolved, through margins skillfully used, the office of Secretary-General had grown in stature and authority far beyond what the framers of the Charter seem to have envisaged at San Francisco. This was quite widely recognized; someone, I know not who, had even jested that the motto of the Secretary-General ought to be Per Ambigua ad Astra [ambiguity unlimited]. To most good "United Nations people," like myself, this growth seemed entirely healthy. . . . As for Mr. Hammarskjold himself, we had complete confidence in him as being-- I quote the words used about him, in private, by a Russian member of the Secretariat-- "an integritous man." We even, I think, found something slightly intoxicating in the paradox of equivocation being used in the service of virtue, the thought of a disinterested Talleyrand, a Machiavelli of peace.15

Aside from that, however, Hammarskjold was almost a political rubber stamp of Trygve Lie. He was an outspoken socialist, was openly sympathetic toward world Communism, and pushed hard for the admission of Red China to the United Nations. It was while Hammarskjold was in charge of UN affairs in the Swedish foreign office in 1951 that his government refused to support a mild UN resolution condemning Red China as an aggressor in Tibet.

The kind of people a man chooses for his closest assistants and advisors is a good indication of the man himself. A glimpse at the Congo executive advisory committee affords a fairly typical view. As we have seen, Conor O'Brien and Ralph Bunche held key positions in this committee. As for other members, O'Brien gave us an interesting insight when he wrote: "Nobody said out loud, 'keep Communism out of Africa' . . . and indeed most people round that table would have been genuinely shocked, and for a moment even puzzled, if such language had been used."16

Shortly after the Hungarian uprising the United Nations sent a small team of investigators to Europe to interview as many of the refugees as possible in an attempt to document the tragedy. This was a far cry from the vigorous action they took against the anti-Communists in Katanga, but it was a nice gesture just the same which, while it did not help the Hungarian Freedom Fighters, was offered to the American people as evidence that the United Nations did do something.

Active in this committee was Povle Bang-Jensen. Determined to do a conscientious job, he found that the only way he could get the refugees to testify was to personally promise them that their names would not be disclosed to anyone else-especially anyone at the United Nations.

Most of these people still had relatives inside Hungary and they feared that if their identities were known their loved ones would be executed or imprisoned. This seemed fair enough, but not for Dag Hammarskjold. He insisted that Bang-Jensen turn over the list of names in spite of Bang-Jensen's promise to the refugees. Rather than break his word or endanger the lives of innocent people, Bang-Jensen burned the list on the roof of the United Nations building. Hammarskjold was furious. Bang-Jensen was fired amidst a barrage of sweeping accusations, including insanity. No UN tribunal demanded reinstatement or cash indemnification.

To further complicate the situation, Bang-Jensen had been approached in confidence by a potential Soviet defector who pleaded with him to help arrange for asylum in the United States. The defector told Bang-Jensen that the thirty-eighth floor of the United Nations, where the top administrative offices are located, was actually under Communist control and that the Soviet secret police had successfully penetrated even the American intelligence services. This shocking information was then dispatched to Allen Dulles, head of our Central Intelligence Agency, who, instead of moving resolutely to acquire the full details from this vital source of information, let Bang-Jensen and the Soviet defector cool their heels for seven long and agonizing months before even expressing any interest. By this time the defector had been sent back to Russia. The CIA never did ask Bang-Jensen for details.

Shortly afterward, Bang-Jensen's body was found in a park in New York. Although it appeared to be a suicide, the surrounding evidence as presented by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee strongly indicates that he was murdered by the Soviet secret police for knowing too much.

But the most interesting part of all is the fact that several of the Hungarian refugees interviewed were formerly officials of the Hungarian Communist party. When testifying, they specifically wanted assurances that their names would not be made known to the Secretary-General.17 One can only wonder why.

U Thant: One of the strongest political groups in Burma today is the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League, an organization that leans considerably to the left. U Thant was at one time the press and publicity director for this group.18 But it was U Nu, then prime minister of Burma, who really brought Thant into politics. U Nu regarded U Thant as his personal friend and advisor, made him his first secretary and also appointed him to the United Nations. In short, Thant was the protégé of U Nu. It is certain that Thant’s political beliefs and basic orientation could not have strayed too far from those of his tutor without disrupting the close working relationship and mutual confidence so obviously shared by them for many years. What, then, is the political philosophy of U Nu?

In a speech delivered on May Day, 1948, U Nu declared:

When I moved that the draft constitution of the Burma Union should be approved by the Constituent Assembly, I stated clearly that Burma was to be a leftist country. . . . In such a leftist country, the production of commodities is not for the purpose of profit. . . . Briefly, leftism is the policy by which the world is being turned from the wrong path to the right path. . . . Lenin and Stalin, when building up Russia, did not use everything which the found in the writings of Karl Marx. They adopted what was suitable for Russia. In [Red] China also leftist leaders adopted what was suitable for that country. Not very long ago when my friend Ko Ohn went to (Communist] Poland, he was advised by Polish leftists thus: "We don't go wrong because others go wrong. We do what is suitable for Poland and we advise Burma to do what is suitable for Burma."

See what Stalin did to build up Russia's own strength. In 1939, in order to bring additional strength to Russia, he entered into a non-aggression treaty even with Hitler. . . . When Trotsky was trying to bring about a world revolution, he accused Stalin and his followers, who were endeavoring to strengthen Russia, of being traitors to the revolution. . . . If we now look back to history, we find that Stalin followed the right path.19

U Nu then went on to advocate the following program. Strengthen ties with Soviet Russia; confiscate all capitalist enterprises in Burma; abolish private ownership of land; form a league for the propagation of Marxist doctrine; and create a peoples democratic army.

Knowing what kind of political views were held by U Nu, we are now better able to appreciate the full impact of the following rather innocuous news item that appeared in the November 16, 1961, issue of the Burma Weekly Bulletin:

Before Burma became independent soon after the Second World War, U Thant entered the political field upon call by General Aung San and U Nu. On September 1, 1947, he was made deputy director (press), information department. As a public servant, U Thant earned reputation and rapid promotion because of his ability, hard work, simpleness and good nature. U Thant was promoted as secretary in the same ministry before becoming the prime minister's secretary on January 1954. In the year 1952, U Thant went to the seventh session of the U General Assembly as a member of the Burmese delegation. Since then, he has traveled widely and generally in the company of Prime Minister U Nu as a trusted advisor and friend.20 [Italics added.]

In March of 1962 U Nu was ousted by General Ne Win. This was hardly an anti-Communist or anti-socialist coup. The new Government merely speeded up the machinery which U Nu had set in motion. All commercial banks were taken over by the state, all private industry was declared illegal, and the entire economy was put under "total state control."21

After Thant was elected Secretary-General he immediately began to exercise his special brand of Burmese impartiality. One has almost grown accustomed to the kind of headlines which appeared on the front page of the Chicago Tribune on December 3, 1962: "Thant Asks U.S. To Meet Reds at UN: Chides West and Lauds Nikita."22 Thant blasted the United States for resuming nuclear testing: "A manifestation of a very dangerous psychosis," he called it. He said nothing about Russia's series of tests.23 It was U Thant who tried to tone down the UN resolution against the brutal Soviet suppression of Hungary. It was Thant who was so alarmed and disturbed over United States sanctions against Communist Cuba and who proposed UN control posts in the Caribbean and in the United States to prevent an American invasion.24 After UN troops had conducted themselves like barbarians in the Congo, it was U Thant who sent them these accolades of praise: "Their loyalty to the United Nations, their team spirit and comradeship have been an inspiration to all those who value the peace-keeping role of the UN. . . . In truth I have every reason to be proud of their discipline and their conduct."25

Since U Thant is the present Secretary-General of the United Nations and is very much involved in what that organization does, let us enter one more piece of evidence into the record--Thant's views expressed in his own words. Speaking in 1958 before the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia, he said:

Let me be candid. When American foreign policy did concern itself with what was happening in the rest of the world, it did so out of fear and suspicion-- fear of Communism and suspicion of Communist motives. Fear and suspicion are very undesirable states of mind. They breed hatred, and hatred in turn breeds cruelty and intolerance. Fear of Soviet Communism has led the United States, and those who follow her lead, to take a distorted view of the world situation and of the forces that are at work in modern society. . . .

The U.S. policy toward China is unreal. It needs a thorough reexamination and reappraisal. . . . The refusal of the United States to support the admission of China to the United Nations is based on two assumptions-- that the Chinese government's behavior unfits it for membership in the world organization; that the Peiping government's grip on China may be broken at any moment. No one, however, believes this. . . .

It can be argued, however, that though the Soviet Union has not as yet attempted to impose its will on any state outside the Communist cordon, the Soviet has had and still has the intention to do so whenever the circumstances are favorable. But it is very difficult to arrive at an objective appraisal of such suppositions. Suspicions are not proof, and it is doubtful whether any. proof has been established to sustain this chargre.26

If the above quotation does not speak for itself, there is little that could be added here to make it any plainer.

When the Soviet demand for a troika was defeated at the United Nations, it was hailed as a great victory for the West. But was it? Or was it another one of those apparent Soviet defeats which in reality was a strategic victory for them. In this case the Communists were demanding that the single position of secretary-general be replaced by a group of three men. U Thant held out for the status quo. The status quo was maintained but note the men that Thant appointed as his two principal assistants: G. P. Arkadev of the Soviet Union and Ralph Bunche of the United States. In reality, the Soviets did obtain their troika. In fact, they were so pleased with the arrange that, in spite of all their fiery oratory to create the public impression that they were not getting their way, they never even bothered to introduce a formal proposal for their troika in either the Security Council or the General Assembly. It was all for propaganda value, nothing more.27

These, then, are the non-Communists that Mr. Stevenson says keep the United Nations out of Communist hands; the "citizens of the world" who place loyalty to every nation above loyalty to their own native land; the neutral men who spend their lives advocating Communist causes.

Several years ago, Mr. Joseph Z. Kornfeder, a former member of the Communist party, summarized all that we have been trying to demonstrate in this section of the book. His words deserve serious consideration by all Americans:

Now, as to the United Nations. If you were, let's say. a building engineer, and someone were to show you a set of blueprints about a certain building, you would know from those blueprints how that building was going to look. Organization "blueprints" can be read the same way. I need not be a member of the United Nations Secretariat to know that the UN "blueprint" is a Communist one. I was at the Moscow headquarters of the world Communist party for nearly three years and was acquainted with most of the top leaders, and, of course, I was also a leading party worker. I went to their colleges; I learned their pattern of operations, and if I see that pattern in effect anywhere, I can recognize it.

The UN idea was sold to us on the basis that a setup of that sort was needed to keep the peace in this world. Nothing was said about the UN being a world Government in the making. I need waste no time about the UN peace-keeping qualities. With an aggressive Communist world empire on the loose and sitting right inside the UN, that idea was definitely unrealistic in the first place; unrealistic and disastrous as many of the New Deal's foreign policies.

From the point of view of its master designers meeting at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods, and which included such masterful agents as Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie, and others, the UN was, and is, not a failure. They and the Kremlin masterminds behind them never intended the UN as a peace-keeping organization. What they had in mind was a fancy and colossal Trojan horse under the wings of which their smaller agencies could more effectively operate. And in that they succeeded, even beyond their expectations. . . .

The United Nations is the sole great survivor, the grand monument, as it were, to the greatest folly of all time; namely, the illegitimate marriage between the New Deal and Communism. Its internal setup, Communist designed, is a pattern for sociological conquest; a pattern aimed to serve the purpose of Communist penetration of the West. It is ingenious and deceptive.28

<<Chapter 9


Chapter 11>>


1. United Nations Guardian of Peace, Department of State publication -#7225 (September 1961), p. 2.

2. U.S. News and World Report (October 22, 1954), p. 53. Also V. Orval Watts, The United Nations: Planned Tyranny (New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1955), p. 32.

3. Wall Street Journal (December 23, 1957).

4. U.S. News and World Report (October 15, 1954), P. 86. Also, Watts, UN: Planned Tyranny, p. 32.

5. Testimony of former Communist John Lautner before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Operations (September 11, 1953), p. 42.

6. "The Communist Pattern in the UN," speech by Joseph Z. Kornfeder before the Congress of Freedom, Veterans War Memorial Auditorium (San Francisco, April 1955).

7. "Is the United Nations Anti-U.S.?" U.S. News and World Report (December 12, 1952), p. 32.

8. Lie, pp. 11, 16, 17.

9. Isaac Don Levine, The Mind of an Assassin (New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., 1959), pp. xvii, 8, 9. Levine, a lifelong student of Communism, draws upon a wealth of personal experience dating back to his firsthand knowledge of the Russian revolution and his close association with the early leading Bolsheviks, including Leon Trotsky. When Trotsky was the supreme chief of the Red Army during the civil war, Levine personally accompanied him to the front as a foreign correspondent. Also, "A Letter from Trotsky," the Nation (October 10, 1936), p. 431. Also, Preliminary Commission of Inquiry (held in Mexico City), The Case of Leon Trotsky (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1937), pp. 32, 405.

10. Lie, p. 254.

11. Ibid., pp. 5-10.

12. Ibid., p. 26.

13. Ibid., p. 265.

14. Ibid., p. 171.

15. O'Brien, p. 47.

16. O'Brien, P. 59.

17. The Bang-Jensen Case, SISS report (September 14, 1961), p. 9.

18. Vera Micheles Dean, West and Non West--New Perspectives (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1963), introduction.

19. Toward Peace and Democracy (Burmese Ministry of Information, 1949).

20. "U Thant Appointed Secretary-General of United Nations," Burma Weekly Bulletin (Rangoon, November 16, 1961).

21. "Where Reds May Take Over a Key Country," U.S. News and World Report (April 1, 1963), p. 69. Also, "Left Full Rudder," Newsweek (March 11, 1963), p. 46. Also, "Army Socialism," Time (February 22, 1963), p. 32.

22. Chicago Tribune (December 3, 1962).

23. "Thant Blasts A-Testing in Space by U.S." Chicago Tribune (June 6, 1962), sec. 2, p. 10.

24. Richmond News-Leader (March 7, 1963).

25. United Nations Review (July 1963), pp. 55-56. Also, 46 Angry Men, p. 14.

26. As quoted by Congressman James B. Utt, Congressional Record (April 11, 1962).

27. United Nations Guardian of Peace, Department of State publication, #7225 (September 1961), p. 25.

28. "The Communist Pattern in the UN," speech by Joseph Z. Kornfeder before the Congress of Freedom, Veterans War Memorial Auditorium (San Francisco, April 1955).
<<Chapter 9


Chapter 11>>