The Fearful Master - Chapter 17
THE FEARFUL MASTER

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: POINT OF NO RETURN

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The saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time.

Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland, 1937

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: POINT OF NO RETURN

In the far reaches of the globe, there live tiny rodent-like creatures called lemmings. They lead a rather solitary life and seem to be well adjusted to their environment. They look and behave in quite a normal fashion--except for one curious idiosyncrasy. Every once in a while, after several years of unusual prosperity for the lemming clan, they suddenly get an uncontrollable urge to go for a swim. Almost as though on cue, they come from all the remote parts of the terrain and, joining together into one huge army, march relentlessly to the sea. When they get there, they fling themselves into the surf and swim straight out from shore. Days later the beaches are piled deep with the tiny bodies where the tide has washed them up to decay in the sun.

Nothing resembles these lemmings quite so much as the way we Americans have been stampeding to our own destruction. We have already abandoned the secure ground of national strength and independence to leap into the boiling waters of internationalism. We are swimming straight out to sea as though there were a brighter, more secure paradise just ahead. But the water gets deeper by the minute, and our strength is beginning to ebb. Soon, even if we change our minds and decide to turn back to shore, it will be too late. We are rapidly approaching the point of no return--disarmament.

Almost everyone, of course, is opposed to war--particularly nuclear war--and we would all like to see the nations of the world throw their weapons on the scrap-heap and live peacefully together. In fact, this has been an ancient desire of noble-minded men since the dawn of history. But does setting rid of one's best weapons prevent war? Unfortunately not. It merely means that men then fight with their second-best weapons. Or it may mean that one side fights with its second-best weapons while the other uses superior weapons that everyone thought had been destroyed but which had been kept and perfected in secret.

It is true that in the past arming has always led to war; but so has disarming! Remember Pearl Harbor and Korea? As a matter of fact, most wars would never have been started but for the aggressor thinking he was sufficiently superior in military forces to overcome the opposition. A disarmed nation, therefore, is far more likely to be attacked and plunged into war than one that is armed. This is particularly true in the world of today where international Communism is carrying out its avowed program of global conquest. High ranking Soviet military officers who have defected to the West have told us that the Communists are just waiting for us to lower our guard. Nikolai F. Artamanov, for instance, a former Soviet naval captain, testified on September 14, 1960, before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and said that Soviet strategy is based upon a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S. if the Soviet leaders could be assured that victory would come at once.1

Note, however, that the Communists do not want to inflict nuclear devastation on America. They want to capture our great nation intact with all of our skilled labor and productive capacity to feed and support their world slave empire. Nuclear war is a. last resort for them, and then only if they are positive of immediate victory.

Some people find comfort in this thought; but it is doubtful that they have any idea of what living under Communism is like. They feel that any life--even life inside a Communist slave labor camp--is better than risking death under the A-bomb. They are. willing to send our young men into battle to the four corners of' the world to die for their safety and freedom here at home, but they are not willing to risk their own hides for the same cause. Patrick Henry's choice of "liberty or death" has now given way to the "better Red than dead" motto of San Francisco's beatniks--and Washington's, too. As Adlai Stevenson paraphrased it: "Compared with the stake of survival, every other interest is minor and every other preoccupation petty."2

If mere survival has now become more important to Americans than freedom and all "other interests" or "preoccupations," then the men who sacrificed their lives at Lexington and Concord, at Valley Forge, at Saipan and Normandy must loath us from the grave, for we have asked them to die in vain.

The truly ironic part about all of this, however, is that we do not have to choose between being Red or dead at all. If we wake up and move into action, we can be both alive and free. All we have to do is be realistic about our situation and come to grips with the fact that so long as the Kremlin is dedicated to world domination, we have no choice but to keep ourselves well armed with the very latest weapons. Strength is the only language the Communists understand and it is the only thing that has kept their commissars out of our country so far.

That Senator Barry Goldwater is one of the realists who understands these facts of life, is clear from his voting record against disarmament proposals as well as from his following remarks:

If an enemy power is bent on conquering you, and proposes to turn all of his resources to that end, he is at war with you; and you-- unless you contemplate surrender-- are at war with him. Moreover-- unless you contemplate treason-- your objective, like his, will be victory. Not peace, but victory. . . .

Peace, to be sure, is a proper goal for American policy-- as long as it is understood that peace is not all we seek. For we do not want the peace of surrender. We want a peace in which freedom and justice will prevail, and that-- given the nature of Communism-- is a peace in which Soviet power will no longer be in position to threaten us and the rest of the world. A tolerable peace, in other words, must follow victory over Communism. We have been . . . years trying to bury that unpleasant fact. It cannot be buried and any foreign policy that ignores it will lead to our extinction as a nation.

We do not, of course, want to achieve victory by force of arms. If possible, overt hostilities should always be avoided; especially is this so when a shooting war may cause the death of many millions of people, including our own. But we cannot, for that reason, make the avoidance of a shooting war our chief objective. If we do that-- if we tell ourselves that it is more important to avoid shooting than to keep our freedom-- we are committed to a course that has only one terminal point: Surrender!3

Everyone knows that the Soviets have always been among the most outspoken advocates of disarmament. Unfortunately, too many Americans have taken this at face value and assumed that the motive behind this was an honest desire to spare mankind from the horrors of war. But what are the horrors of war? Why, death and destruction, of course. Yet, the Communists have perpetrated more death and destruction behind the iron and bamboo curtains than most of the wars of history combined. The only difference was that there was no organized opposition. The millions who have been executed did not die in combat, but in concentration camps. This, of course, is what the Communists mean when they advocate peace--the elimination of all opposition to Communism.

How sincere are they, then, when they promote disarmament? To answer that question, it is necessary to look back to the year 1928. One of the principles expounded at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in that year was: "The disarmament policy of the Soviet Government must be utilized for purposes of agitation . . . for recruiting sympathizers for the Soviet Union."4

Thirty-three years later, Khrushchev revealed that the Communist strategy in this regard had not changed one iota. Speaking in Moscow on January 6, 1961, he declared that the propaganda effectiveness of promoting a Soviet-inspired peace program was an effective means of wooing the sympathy of the masses behind the banner of Communism. He even admitted that the Kremlin's plan was to make the slogan for peace fit hand-in-hand with the slogan for Communism. Speaking very candidly, he said:

In the eyes of the masses, Communism will appear as a force capable of saving mankind from the horrors of modern destructive missile-nuclear war, while imperialism [meaning capitalism] is ever more associated in the minds of the masses as a system engendering wars. That is why the slogan of the struggle for peace is, as it were, a sputnik [meaning fellow traveler] of the slogan of the struggle for Communism.

What a beautiful strategy this has been. Appealing to the natural desire in all of us for peace, the Communists have been able to enlist literally thousands of well-meaning Americans into campaigning for disarmament and other Communist objectives. Housewives, students, professors and ministers have been enticed into supporting organizations and groups whose platforms read like a page out of the Communist People's World. The Turn Toward Peace movement, for instance, is one of the largest and best known of these groups. The following is just a partial list of the initiatives recommended in their official program of action:

1. Urge the opening of editorial columns of U.S. newspapers and magazines to Soviet and Red Chinese writers.

2. Double our financial support to all UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO, etc.

3. Stop all travel curbs on Soviet citizens in the U.S.

4. Invite one thousand Soviet teachers and journalists to undertake at our expense a three month lecture tour of the U.S.

5. Invite five thousand Soviet "tourists" to vacation at our expense in the U.S.

6. Repeal the Connally Amendment.

7. Admit Red China to the UN.

8. Put the Peace Corps under UN administration.

9. Stop all U.S. nuclear testing even if the Soviets continue testing.

10. Invite the Soviets to plug into our missile early warning radar svstem.5

These platforms did not just happen, of course. They were carefully written by people who knew what they were doing. Both the House Committee on Un-American Activities and various state investigating committees have reported that known Communists have penetrated into key positions within such groups as Women's Strike for Peace, The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, and the American Friends Service Committee.6 The investigators made it very clear that the majority of the members of these groups had no idea that they were being used to promote Communist objectives, and probably would not believe it if they were told. Unfortunately, most of them have never even questioned the sincerity of the leaders within the so-called peace movement and fewer still have ever bothered to inform themselves of basic Communist strategy. Consequently, Gus Hall, head of the Communist party in the United States, is able to boast that the peace movements continue to gather force and momentum. He stated quite frankly that the most active of these have been the Women's Strike for Peace and the Turn Toward Peace groups. He noted that "there are literally tons of literature for peace distributed in this country; tons and tons of it!"7

As pointed out earlier, however, the Communists are agitating in this country for disarmament for a far more important reason than merely fooling a lot of innocent Americans. Going back once again to the statement of principles issued by the Communist Sixth World Congress in 1928, we find: "The aim of the Soviet proposals is . . . to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulates that disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of Capitalism."8 [Italics added.] Bringing it more up to date, Khrushchev has said: "The slogan for the struggle for peace must not contradict the slogan for the struggle for Communism. The struggle for disarmament . . . is an effective struggle against imperialism . . . for restricting its military potentialities."9 And in December 1960 at a Moscow meeting of representatives from all over the world, Communist leaders declared: "An active, determined Communist struggle" must be waged to "force the imperialists into an agreement on general disarmament."10

As we shall see, Washington officialdom was thinking along exactly parallel lines and was putting the whole plan into operation just as fast as American public opinion would permit. Speaking in Geneva on July 21, 1955, President Eisenhower said:

I have been searching, my- heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the U.S. in approaching this problem of disarmament. I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union. . . . I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step; that we begin an arrangement very quickly, as between ourselves, immediately. These steps would include: to give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide blueprints to each other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country. Likewise, we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.11

If that was but a beginning, we got an idea of what may ultimately be in store for us when it was announced a few years later that the Defense Department had authorized several nonprofit scientific agencies to prepare a comprehensive study of the conditions under which it would be advisable for the U.S. not to retaliate against a surprise nuclear attack. In other words, if it looked as though the Soviets had struck a killing first blow, the plan would be to surrender without fighting. They call this "strategic" surrender.12

Seemingly in keeping with this long range plan, President Eisenhower proposed a United Nations Atomic Energy Agency which came into existence on October 23, 1956. Three days later, before the Senate even had a chance to legally ratify our participation, Eisenhower pledged the United States to give the new agency eleven thousand pounds of uranium 235 and, after that, to match the combined contributions of all other nations put together. Senator Joseph McCarthy fought hard against Senate ratification of our participation in this agency on the basis that Communists in the United Nations could easily take it over and use it against us. President Eisenhower assured the Senate that "the ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to a surprise seizure."13 Since our scientists were unable to prevent the Communists from stealing A-bomb secrets and vital parts from right under our noses, one wonders how Eisenhower thought we were doing to prevent them from doing the same thing in an international organization in which they are members and over which we have no control. At any rate, the Senate ratified our commitment on June 18, 1957, and by the end of October, Communist bloc nations had gained full control of the UN Atomic Energy Agency. Not only did open Communists quickly capture over one fourth of the positions on the agency's board of directors, but the very top post, that of chairman of the board, was given to Dr. Pavel Winckler, a prominent Communist from Czechoslovakia. Eisenhower and the State Department professed to be surprised, indignant and perturbed.14

When President Kennedy came into office, he picked up right where Eisenhower left off. The Soviet deputy foreign minister, Vasily Kuznetsov, had complained that no progress toward easing tensions between East and West could be made as long as the U.S. maintained what he called "provocative" weapons. He specifically mentioned the manned bombers of our Strategic Air Command and our missiles deployed on foreign bases. He suggested that we scrap these weapons and build up, instead, a system of strictly secondary missiles and "conventional" non-nuclear weapons. President Kennedy's defense message to Congress in 1961 was exactly along these lines. Among the weapons deleted from the budget that year, and each year thereafter, were the B-70 bomber and the anti-missile missile. We have stopped production of all manned bombers, are systematically putting into mothballs those that we have, and have now replaced our overseas missiles with Polaris submarines.

Commenting on President Kennedy’s proposals, an article in the Chicago Sun-Times on March 30, 1961, reported:

It is known that large sections of the President's defense message were written explicitly for the consumption of top Russian officials. Moreover, on the recommendation of Charles E. Bohlen, the State Department's leading expert on Russia, certain Communist phraseology was inserted in the message. . . . That much of the defense message was directed to the Soviet leaders is evident in the fact that Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., ambassador to Russia, was given a special briefing on it. . . . The message will now be forwarded to him in Moscow so he can reassure Soviet officials that the U.S. is taking care not to produce a "first strike capability." . . . Most of the sessions [at the White House leading up to the formulation of this policy] were directed by Mr. Kennedy's chief aid, Theodore Sorensen, who repeatedly made it clear that the President wanted to avoid provocative offensive weapons.15

Theodore Sorensen was a conscientious objector during the Korean War.16

As for the Polaris missiles that are now apparently the mainstay of our ability to deter a surprise nuclear attack: how good are they? Mr. Arthur I. Waskow is the man whom the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has appointed as the expert to draft further disarmament proposals for the United States. He revealed that in his opinion the Polaris is not a provocative weapon because it is incapable of attacking an enemy's atomic force. This is because the megatonnage of the Polaris missile is too limited to damage hardened missile bases or to knock out a hidden base with a near miss. Waskow also pointed out that the Polaris, launched at sea with all the difficulties of precise and accurate aiming that any ship encounters, is incapable of direct hits on mobile missiles. He said that in order to avoid turning the Polaris into a provocative weapon, the Navy should restrict the number of its Polaris submarines to no more than 45. Secretary of Defense McNamara has scheduled construction of a total of 41!17

As a result of the last series of Soviet underwater tests of the one hundred megaton bomb, it was revealed that underwater shock waves were so great that they could easily damage or destroy a submarine anywhere within hundreds of miles. A few such blasts in waters within striking distance of the relatively short-range Polaris missile could likely wipe out our entire fleet of submarines deployed there.

Mr. Paul H. Nitze as assistant secretary of defense delivered a speech in 1960 to a group of business and professional men at Asilomar on California s Monterey Peninsula. In his speech, which was sponsored by the 6th U.S. Army, the Western Sea Frontier U.S. Navy and the 4th Air Force, Mr. Nitze advocated that we unilaterally reduce our armaments; that we scrap all our fixed-base bomber and missile bases; that we place our Strategic Air Command under NATO direction; and that we inform the United Nations "that NATO will turn over ultimate power of decision on the use of these systems to the General Assembly of the UN."18

When the press reported the substance of these proposals, alarmed citizens began to write their objections to Washington. Government officials responded by tripping all over themselves contradicting each other's assurances and denials. For instance, Dr. Lawrence G. Osborne of Santa Barbara, California, received one reply from the Defense Department stating flatly that a proposal to turn SAC over to NATO was definitely not under consideration. Another reply from then Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson said: "The proposal that the Strategic Air Command be placed under the overall administration and command of NATO is one that is being given a great deal of thought and deliberation."

Mr. Nitze has also recommended that Quemoy and Matsu be turned over to Red China, that we extend diplomatic recognition to Red China, and that Red China be admitted to the United Nations. Consequently, President Kennedy appointed him secretary of the navy.

In September of 1961 the State Department finally brought forth the grand product of its long labor in the form of publication 7277, entitled Freedom From War--The U.S. Program for General and Complete Disarmament. This attractively printed booklet contains the disarmament proposals that the United States Government submitted to the United Nations, and outlines in detail the point of no return that is now a reality right before our eyes. The following excerpts speak for themselves:

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a.) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations peace force;

(b.) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations peace force and for maintaining internal order;

(c.) The establishment and effective operation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

. . . no state would have a military power to challenge the progressively strengthened UN peace force. . . .

Explaining in more detail just what lies behind the rather vague term "disarmament," President Kennedy said that it means:

. . . A revolutionary change in the political structure of the world; creation of a radically new international system; abandonment of most of the old concepts of national states; development of international institutions that would encourage nations to give up much of their national sovereignty; acceptance without question or reservation of the jurisdiction of the international court; willingness to depend for national security on an international peace force under an immensely changed and strengthened United Nations.19

Commenting further on these proposals, Walt Rostow, chairman of the State Department policy planning board, wrote:

It is a legitimate American national objective to remove from all nations-- including the U.S.-- the right to use substantial military force to pursue their own interests. Since this residual right is the root of national sovereignty and the basis for the existence of an international arena of power, it is, therefore an American interest to see an end to nationhood as it has been historically defined.20 [Italics added.]

Adlai Stevenson spelled it out for all to understand when he said: "In short, the U.S. program calls for total elimination of national capacity to make international war." And then, as though inscribing the epitaph on our national tombstone, he added: "it is presented in dead earnest."21

The same month that the State Department submitted the U.S. proposal for complete disarmament to the United Nations, Congress passed the necessary legislation authorizing the President to carry out all the terms of the proposal. The so-called safeguard in the act was that no disarmament steps could be taken "except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President," which, as we have seen, poses no limitations at all. And so the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created and empowered to enter into whatever disarmament agreements it desired, even without congressional consent. After the newly created agency began to swing into action, several of the congressmen who had voted for it began to wake up to the insidious nature of the whole scheme. Congressman William Bray, for instance, said:

Many of us, including myself, had great hopes for the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency when we voted for the authorization and appropriations for its operation. After observing the operation of this agency for one year, I am deeply disappointed. Instead of working on plans to represent the interests of America and the free world in disarmament plans, this agency has apparently been studying reasons for the free world to surrender to the Kremlin to avoid the strife and turmoil that is inherent in freedom.22

In 1963 there was a great deal of excitement about the Moscow Test Ban Treaty. Military men testified that such a treaty would seriously hamper our ability to keep abreast of recent Soviet weapon advances. The Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee issued a report stating that such a test ban treaty would "result in serious and perhaps formidable military and technical disadvantages."23 The treaty was ratified, nevertheless, on the strength of so-called political advantages which were never clearly defined.

The truly amazing part of it was that there was so much widespread public opposition to the treaty. There should have been, of course, but it was interesting to see such universal concern and alarm over a test ban treaty that was nothing compared to the far more disastrous steps that had already been taken, and were still being taken at that very time. Here, the American people were getting all excited over the possibility of a Communist military superiority, while still continuing to support policies leading to a Communist military monopoly! What difference does it make whether our missiles are as good as theirs if they have control of them both?

This being the case, it was puzzling at first to understand why both Washington and Moscow were pushing so hard for this particular treaty. Was it to divert attention away from the more sinister disarmament measures now being taken? Was it to further reinforce the false image that our greatest danger is from outside military attack rather than from internal subversion? Or was it primarily a propaganda weapon for the Soviets to use showing that the United States is now so fearful of the military superiority of Communism that it was willing to travel to Moscow and sign a treaty which was clearly to its military disadvantage?

All of these purposes played a part, of course, but the most important feature of the entire treaty was one which received practically no public attention or concern. Buried deep within the terminology of the treaty was a phrase that took disarmament out of the proposal stage and put it in the commitment stage. When the Senate ratified the treaty it created a "supreme law of the land" which now binds the U.S., in the words of the treaty itself, to "the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations."

The true significance of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, therefore, was simply to take us one more very important step closer to the ultimate transfer of our nuclear weapons to the United Nations. The first step was our formal proposal to the UN in 1961. The second was the passing of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which made it legally possible. The third step, the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, has committed us to carry out the plan. All that is now left is to do it. Nothing else stands in the way. Without consulting Congress or the Senate, the President and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can surrender our weapons whenever they wish.

And so, on September 20, 1963, President Kennedy addressed the UN and said:

Two years ago, I told this body that the United States had proposed and was willing to sign a limited test ban treaty. Today that treaty has been signed. It will not put an end to war. It will not remove basic conflicts. It will not secure freedom for all. But it can be a lever. As Archimedes, in explaining the principle of the lever, was said to have declared to his friends: "Give me a place where I can stand-- and I shall move the world."24

 

Exactly four months later, on January 21, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson spoke over nationwide radio and television and, parroting the sentiments of his predecessor, said:

This morning in Geneva, Switzerland, the eighteen nation committee on disarmament resumed its work. There is only one item on the agenda today of that conference. It is the leading item on the agenda of all mankind, and that one item is peace. . . .We now have a limited nuclear test ban treaty. We now have an emergency communications link, a "hot-line" between Washington and Moscow. We now have an agreement in the United Nations to keep bombs out of outer space.

These are small steps, but they go in the right direction, the direction of security and sanity and peace. Now we must go further. . . . The best way to begin disarming is to begin. And we shall hear any plan, go any place, make any plea, and play any part that offers a realistic prospect for peace.25

For years, the master planners have been telling the innocent assembly line workers that the UN is only a debating arena, an international forum where world opinion focuses on events of the day. As such, we have been led to believe that there is no way for the UN to legislate or to impose its will on anybody. Events in Katanga, however, should enable anyone with even a modicum of intelligence to see through that subterfuge. If the UN is successful in its present drive to acquire the full control of the complete military apparatus of the United States, including our nuclear weapons, and our national armies, there will be many more Katangas to come. Some of them will be on our soil.

Special UN forces have already made practice seizures of American cities. U.S. soldiers, carrying the United Nations flag, and wearing UN armbands, staged a mock take-over of nine California cities on July 31, 1951. The same occurred in Lampasas, Texas, on April 3, 1952. The same at Watertown, New York, on August 20, 1952. In 1963 the Army announced that it was conducting similar exercises in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. What are they practicing for?

The point of no return is here now! If we cross it, we will find ourselves living in a world where the realities of peace are worse than the horrors of war; and where the suffering of life is worse than the agony of death. It will be a world of our own creating; and it will be one from which there is no escape.

While there is yet a little time, the choice is ours.

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NOTES

1. "Ex-Russ Navy Man Plan--Sneak Attack Devised by K.," Los Angeles Examiner (September 15, 1960), sec. 1, p. 1.

2. Speech by Adlai Stevenson before the General Federation of Women's Clubs (Philadelphia, May 24, 1955).

3. Senator Barry Goldwater, "Would a Strengthened UN Enhance U.S. Security and World Peace?--No!" Congressional Digest (August-September 1960) p. 201-203.

4. Thesis Resolutions of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International (International Press Correspondents, November 28, 1928), vol. 8, no. 84, pp. 1590, 1596-1597.

5. American Initiatives in a Turn Toward Peace (Cooper Station, Box 401, New York 3, N.Y., Turn Toward Peace).

6. Los Angeles Times (June 13, 1963), sec. 1, p. 2.

7. Gus Hall, End the Cold War (New York, New Century Publications, 1962), p. 34.

8. Stefan T. Possony, "The Test Ban--An American Strategy for Self-Mutilation," Congressional Record (March 21, 1963), pp. 4358-4370.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. American Historical Documents, p. 412.

12. "Question of When U.S. Should Surrender in All-Out Nuclear Attack Studied for Pentagon," St. Louis Post-Dispatch (August 5, 1958).

13. Report of the Symposium on Military Implications of the UN, Congress of Freedom convention, Veterans War Memorial Auditorium (San Francisco, April 1955).

14. "U.S. News and World Report (December 3, 1954). Also, Robert S. Allen, "Reds Grab Key Job in World Atom Agency," the Tablet (Brooklyn, November 2, 1957).

15. "Inside Story of a Big Switch--Kennedy's Defense Strategy Tailored to Ease Red Fears," Chicago Sun-Times (March 30, 1961).

16. "Do Unilateral Disarmers Influence Defense Policy?" Human Events (Washington, D.C., August 10, 1963), p. 9.

17. James Roosevelt, ed., The Liberal Papers (Garden City, L.I., Doubleday & Company Inc., 1962), pp. 131-132. Also, "Now the Whiz Kids Are Tackling the U.S. Navy," U.S. News and World Report (November 25, 1963), pp. 59-60.

18. Proceedings of the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, prepared by the Stanford Research Institute. As quoted by Congressman James B. Utt, Congressional Record (April 11, 1962).

19. Washington News (April 19, 1962).

20. Congressional Record (June 6, 1963), pp. A-362, A-363.

21. Mr. Stevenson was addressing the first committee of the UN General Assembly on November 15, 1961. See, Documents on Disarmament--1961, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication #5, p. 623.

22. William Bray, "Arms Control Switch," Human Events (Washington, D.C., December 7, 1963), p. 15.

23. Congressional Record (September 13, 1963), pp. 16072-16075.

24. "Kennedy--A Quest for Peace Meeting," Los Angeles Herald-Examiner (September 20, 1963), p. A-8.

25. Department of State Bulletin (February 10, 1964), pp. 223-224.
 
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